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s3_cbc.c

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1/* $OpenBSD: s3_cbc.c,v 1.17 2018/09/08 14:39:41 jsing Exp $ */-
2/* ====================================================================-
3 * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.-
4 *-
5 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without-
6 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions-
7 * are met:-
8 *-
9 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright-
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.-
11 *-
12 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright-
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in-
14 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the-
15 * distribution.-
16 *-
17 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this-
18 * software must display the following acknowledgment:-
19 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project-
20 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"-
21 *-
22 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to-
23 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without-
24 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact-
25 * openssl-core@openssl.org.-
26 *-
27 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"-
28 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written-
29 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.-
30 *-
31 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following-
32 * acknowledgment:-
33 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project-
34 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"-
35 *-
36 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY-
37 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE-
38 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR-
39 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR-
40 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,-
41 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT-
42 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;-
43 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)-
44 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,-
45 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)-
46 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED-
47 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.-
48 * ====================================================================-
49 *-
50 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young-
51 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim-
52 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).-
53 *-
54 */-
55-
56#include "ssl_locl.h"-
57-
58#include <openssl/md5.h>-
59#include <openssl/sha.h>-
60-
61/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length-
62 * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */-
63#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16-
64-
65/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.-
66 * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest-
67 * supported by TLS.) */-
68#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128-
69-
70/* Some utility functions are needed:-
71 *-
72 * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other-
73 * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.-
74 * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace-
75 * them with something else on odd CPUs. */-
76#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ((unsigned)((int)(x) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1)))-
77#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))-
78-
79/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */-
80static unsigned-
81constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b)-
82{-
83 a -= b;-
84 return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a);
executed 29976 times by 1 test: return ((unsigned)((int)(a) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1)));
Executed by:
  • ssltest
29976
85}-
86-
87/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */-
88static unsigned-
89constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b)-
90{-
91 a -= b;-
92 return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
executed 243952 times by 1 test: return ((unsigned)((int)(~a) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1)));
Executed by:
  • ssltest
243952
93}-
94-
95/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */-
96static unsigned char-
97constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b)-
98{-
99 unsigned c = a ^ b;-
100 c--;-
101 return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
executed 2576 times by 1 test: return ((unsigned char)(((unsigned)((int)(c) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1)))));
Executed by:
  • ssltest
2576
102}-
103-
104/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC-
105 * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and-
106 * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record-
107 * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the-
108 * padding was removed.-
109 *-
110 * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.-
111 * returns:-
112 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.-
113 * 1: if the padding was valid-
114 * -1: otherwise. */-
115int-
116tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size,-
117 unsigned mac_size)-
118{-
119 unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;-
120 const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;-
121-
122 /* Check if version requires explicit IV */-
123 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
(s->method->in...gs & (1 << 0))Description
TRUEevaluated 76 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 108 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
76-108
124 /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in-
125 * non-constant time.-
126 */-
127 if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
overhead + blo... > rec->lengthDescription
TRUEnever evaluated
FALSEevaluated 76 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
0-76
128 return 0;
never executed: return 0;
0
129 /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */-
130 rec->data += block_size;-
131 rec->input += block_size;-
132 rec->length -= block_size;-
133 } else if (overhead > rec->length)
executed 76 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
overhead > rec->lengthDescription
TRUEnever evaluated
FALSEevaluated 108 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
0-108
134 return 0;
never executed: return 0;
0
135-
136 padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];-
137-
138 good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);-
139 /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and-
140 * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the-
141 * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1-
142 * bytes of padding.-
143 *-
144 * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks-
145 * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum-
146 * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is-
147 * public information so we can use it.) */-
148 to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */-
149 if (to_check > rec->length - 1)
to_check > rec->length - 1Description
TRUEevaluated 110 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 74 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
74-110
150 to_check = rec->length - 1;
executed 110 times by 1 test: to_check = rec->length - 1;
Executed by:
  • ssltest
110
151-
152 for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
i < to_checkDescription
TRUEevaluated 23816 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 184 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
184-23816
153 unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i);-
154 unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i];-
155 /* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value-
156 * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */-
157 good &= ~(mask&(padding_length ^ b));-
158 }
executed 23816 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
23816
159-
160 /* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,-
161 * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We-
162 * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the-
163 * bits. */-
164 good &= good >> 4;-
165 good &= good >> 2;-
166 good &= good >> 1;-
167 good <<= sizeof(good)*8 - 1;-
168 good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);-
169-
170 padding_length = good & (padding_length + 1);-
171 rec->length -= padding_length;-
172 rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */-
173-
174 return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
executed 184 times by 1 test: return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
Executed by:
  • ssltest
184
175}-
176-
177/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in-
178 * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may-
179 * vary within a 256-byte window).-
180 *-
181 * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to-
182 * this function.-
183 *-
184 * On entry:-
185 * rec->orig_len >= md_size-
186 * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE-
187 *-
188 * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with-
189 * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into-
190 * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't-
191 * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are-
192 * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.-
193 */-
194#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE-
195-
196void-
197ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, const SSL3_RECORD *rec,-
198 unsigned md_size, unsigned orig_len)-
199{-
200#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)-
201 unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];-
202 unsigned char *rotated_mac;-
203#else-
204 unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];-
205#endif-
206-
207 /* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */-
208 unsigned mac_end = rec->length;-
209 unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;-
210 /* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because-
211 * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */-
212 unsigned scan_start = 0;-
213 unsigned i, j;-
214 unsigned div_spoiler;-
215 unsigned rotate_offset;-
216-
217 OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size);-
218 OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);-
219-
220#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)-
221 rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf)&63);-
222#endif-
223-
224 /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */-
225 if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1Description
TRUEevaluated 74 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 110 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
74-110
226 scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
executed 74 times by 1 test: scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
Executed by:
  • ssltest
74
227 /* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the-
228 * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies-
229 * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.-
230 *-
231 * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't-
232 * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it-
233 * to prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */-
234 div_spoiler = md_size >> 1;-
235 div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler) - 1) * 8;-
236 rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;-
237-
238 memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);-
239 for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++) {
i < orig_lenDescription
TRUEevaluated 25752 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 184 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
184-25752
240 unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);-
241 unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);-
242 unsigned char b = rec->data[i];-
243 rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;-
244 j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size);-
245 }
executed 25752 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
25752
246-
247 /* Now rotate the MAC */-
248#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)-
249 j = 0;-
250 for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
i < md_sizeDescription
TRUEevaluated 4224 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 184 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
184-4224
251 /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */-
252 ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset^32];-
253 out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];-
254 rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);-
255 }
executed 4224 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
4224
256#else-
257 memset(out, 0, md_size);-
258 rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;-
259 rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);-
260 for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {-
261 for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)-
262 out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);-
263 rotate_offset++;-
264 rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);-
265 }-
266#endif-
267}
executed 184 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
184
268-
269/* u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in-
270 * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */-
271#define u32toLE(n, p) \-
272 (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \-
273 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \-
274 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \-
275 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))-
276-
277/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard-
278 * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function-
279 * typically does. */-
280static void-
281tls1_md5_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)-
282{-
283 MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx;-
284 u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);-
285 u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);-
286 u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);-
287 u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);-
288}
never executed: end of block
0
289-
290static void-
291tls1_sha1_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)-
292{-
293 SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;-
294 l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);-
295 l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);-
296 l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);-
297 l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);-
298 l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);-
299}
executed 1008 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
1008
300-
301static void-
302tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)-
303{-
304 SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;-
305 unsigned i;-
306-
307 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
i < 8Description
TRUEevaluated 2016 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 252 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
252-2016
308 l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);-
309 }
executed 2016 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
2016
310}
executed 252 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
252
311-
312static void-
313tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)-
314{-
315 SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;-
316 unsigned i;-
317-
318 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
i < 8Description
TRUEevaluated 224 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 28 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
28-224
319 l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);-
320 }
executed 224 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
224
321}
executed 28 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
28
322-
323/* Largest hash context ever used by the functions above. */-
324#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX-
325-
326/* Type giving the alignment needed by the above */-
327#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX_ALIGNMENT SHA_LONG64-
328-
329/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function-
330 * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */-
331char-
332ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)-
333{-
334 switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {-
335 case NID_md5:
never executed: case 4:
0
336 case NID_sha1:
executed 144 times by 1 test: case 64:
Executed by:
  • ssltest
144
337 case NID_sha224:
never executed: case 675:
0
338 case NID_sha256:
executed 36 times by 1 test: case 672:
Executed by:
  • ssltest
36
339 case NID_sha384:
executed 4 times by 1 test: case 673:
Executed by:
  • ssltest
4
340 case NID_sha512:
never executed: case 674:
0
341 return 1;
executed 184 times by 1 test: return 1;
Executed by:
  • ssltest
184
342 default:
never executed: default:
0
343 return 0;
never executed: return 0;
0
344 }-
345}-
346-
347/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded TLS-
348 * record.-
349 *-
350 * ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.-
351 * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.-
352 * md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.-
353 * md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.-
354 * header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.-
355 * data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV.-
356 * data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC-
357 * once the padding has been removed.-
358 * data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole-
359 * record, including padding.-
360 *-
361 * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding-
362 * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain-
363 * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the-
364 * padding too. )-
365 */-
366int-
367ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char* md_out,-
368 size_t* md_out_size, const unsigned char header[13],-
369 const unsigned char *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size,-
370 size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, const unsigned char *mac_secret,-
371 unsigned mac_secret_length)-
372{-
373 union {-
374 /*-
375 * Alignment here is to allow this to be cast as SHA512_CTX-
376 * without losing alignment required by the 64-bit SHA_LONG64-
377 * integer it contains.-
378 */-
379 LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX_ALIGNMENT align;-
380 unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)];-
381 } md_state;-
382 void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);-
383 void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);-
384 unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;-
385 unsigned header_length, variance_blocks,-
386 len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,-
387 num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;-
388 unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */-
389 unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];-
390 /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */-
391 unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];-
392 unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];-
393 unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];-
394 unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;-
395 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;-
396 /* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates-
397 * the hash. */-
398 unsigned md_length_size = 8;-
399 char length_is_big_endian = 1;-
400-
401 /* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about-
402 * many possible overflows later in this function. */-
403 OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024);-
404-
405 switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {-
406 case NID_md5:
never executed: case 4:
0
407 MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c);-
408 md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;-
409 md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform;-
410 md_size = 16;-
411 length_is_big_endian = 0;-
412 break;
never executed: break;
0
413 case NID_sha1:
executed 144 times by 1 test: case 64:
Executed by:
  • ssltest
144
414 SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c);-
415 md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;-
416 md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform;-
417 md_size = 20;-
418 break;
executed 144 times by 1 test: break;
Executed by:
  • ssltest
144
419 case NID_sha224:
never executed: case 675:
0
420 SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);-
421 md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;-
422 md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;-
423 md_size = 224/8;-
424 break;
never executed: break;
0
425 case NID_sha256:
executed 36 times by 1 test: case 672:
Executed by:
  • ssltest
36
426 SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);-
427 md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;-
428 md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;-
429 md_size = 32;-
430 break;
executed 36 times by 1 test: break;
Executed by:
  • ssltest
36
431 case NID_sha384:
executed 4 times by 1 test: case 673:
Executed by:
  • ssltest
4
432 SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);-
433 md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;-
434 md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;-
435 md_size = 384/8;-
436 md_block_size = 128;-
437 md_length_size = 16;-
438 break;
executed 4 times by 1 test: break;
Executed by:
  • ssltest
4
439 case NID_sha512:
never executed: case 674:
0
440 SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);-
441 md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;-
442 md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;-
443 md_size = 64;-
444 md_block_size = 128;-
445 md_length_size = 16;-
446 break;
never executed: break;
0
447 default:
never executed: default:
0
448 /* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been-
449 * called first to check that the hash function is-
450 * supported. */-
451 OPENSSL_assert(0);-
452 if (md_out_size)
md_out_sizeDescription
TRUEnever evaluated
FALSEnever evaluated
0
453 *md_out_size = 0;
never executed: *md_out_size = 0;
0
454 return 0;
never executed: return 0;
0
455 }-
456-
457 OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);-
458 OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);-
459 OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);-
460-
461 header_length = 13;-
462-
463 /* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to-
464 * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the-
465 * padding value.-
466 *-
467 * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not-
468 * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks-
469 * can vary based on the padding.-
470 *-
471 * Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously-
472 * cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */-
473 variance_blocks = 6;-
474 /* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13-
475 * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) */-
476 len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;-
477 /* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including-
478 * |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */-
479 max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;-
480 /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */-
481 num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;-
482 /* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle-
483 * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the-
484 * end to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we-
485 * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can-
486 * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether-
487 * they are plaintext. */-
488 num_starting_blocks = 0;-
489 /* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where-
490 * we start processing. */-
491 k = 0;-
492 /* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be-
493 * MACed. */-
494 mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;-
495 /* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that-
496 * contains application data. */-
497 c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;-
498 /* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating-
499 * value. */-
500 index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;-
501 /* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash-
502 * length, in bits. */-
503 index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;-
504 /* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash-
505 * block for the masked HMAC key. */-
506-
507 if (num_blocks > variance_blocks) {
num_blocks > variance_blocksDescription
TRUEnever evaluated
FALSEevaluated 184 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
0-184
508 num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;-
509 k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks;-
510 }
never executed: end of block
0
511-
512 bits = 8*mac_end_offset;-
513 /* Compute the initial HMAC block. */-
514 bits += 8*md_block_size;-
515 memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);-
516 OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));-
517 memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);-
518 for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
i < md_block_sizeDescription
TRUEevaluated 12032 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 184 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
184-12032
519 hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
executed 12032 times by 1 test: hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
Executed by:
  • ssltest
12032
520-
521 md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);-
522-
523 if (length_is_big_endian) {
length_is_big_endianDescription
TRUEevaluated 184 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEnever evaluated
0-184
524 memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);-
525 length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);-
526 length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);-
527 length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);-
528 length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (unsigned char)bits;-
529 } else {
executed 184 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
184
530 memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size);-
531 length_bytes[md_length_size - 5] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);-
532 length_bytes[md_length_size - 6] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);-
533 length_bytes[md_length_size - 7] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);-
534 length_bytes[md_length_size - 8] = (unsigned char)bits;-
535 }
never executed: end of block
0
536-
537 if (k > 0) {
k > 0Description
TRUEnever evaluated
FALSEevaluated 184 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
0-184
538 /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */-
539 memcpy(first_block, header, 13);-
540 memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);-
541 md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);-
542 for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++)
i < k/md_block_sizeDescription
TRUEnever evaluated
FALSEnever evaluated
0
543 md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13);
never executed: md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13);
0
544 }
never executed: end of block
0
545-
546 memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));-
547-
548 /* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct-
549 * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80-
550 * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in-
551 * constant time, to |mac_out|. */-
552 for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + variance_blocks; i++) {
i <= num_start...ariance_blocksDescription
TRUEevaluated 1288 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 184 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
184-1288
553 unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];-
554 unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);-
555 unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);-
556 for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
j < md_block_sizeDescription
TRUEevaluated 84224 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 1288 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
1288-84224
557 unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;-
558 if (k < header_length)
k < header_lengthDescription
TRUEevaluated 2392 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 81832 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
2392-81832
559 b = header[k];
executed 2392 times by 1 test: b = header[k];
Executed by:
  • ssltest
2392
560 else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
k < data_plus_... header_lengthDescription
TRUEevaluated 26704 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 55128 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
26704-55128
561 b = data[k - header_length];
executed 26704 times by 1 test: b = data[k - header_length];
Executed by:
  • ssltest
26704
562 k++;-
563-
564 is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);-
565 is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c + 1);-
566 /* If this is the block containing the end of the-
567 * application data, and we are at the offset for the-
568 * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */-
569 b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);-
570 /* If this is the block containing the end of the-
571 * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then-
572 * just write zero. */-
573 b = b&~is_past_cp1;-
574 /* If this is index_b (the final block), but not-
575 * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit-
576 * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to-
577 * add an extra block of zeros. */-
578 b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;-
579-
580 /* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the-
581 * length. */-
582 if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) {
j >= md_block_...md_length_sizeDescription
TRUEevaluated 10528 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 73696 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
10528-73696
583 /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */-
584 b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j - (md_block_size - md_length_size)]);-
585 }
executed 10528 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
10528
586 block[j] = b;-
587 }
executed 84224 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
84224
588-
589 md_transform(md_state.c, block);-
590 md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);-
591 /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */-
592 for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
j < md_sizeDescription
TRUEevaluated 29568 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 1288 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
1288-29568
593 mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b;
executed 29568 times by 1 test: mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b;
Executed by:
  • ssltest
29568
594 }
executed 1288 times by 1 test: end of block
Executed by:
  • ssltest
1288
595-
596 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);-
597 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */)) {
!EVP_DigestIni... ((void *)0) )Description
TRUEnever evaluated
FALSEevaluated 184 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
0-184
598 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);-
599 return 0;
never executed: return 0;
0
600 }-
601-
602 /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */-
603 for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
i < md_block_sizeDescription
TRUEevaluated 12032 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEevaluated 184 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
184-12032
604 hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
executed 12032 times by 1 test: hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
Executed by:
  • ssltest
12032
605-
606 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);-
607 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);-
608-
609 EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);-
610 if (md_out_size)
md_out_sizeDescription
TRUEevaluated 184 times by 1 test
Evaluated by:
  • ssltest
FALSEnever evaluated
0-184
611 *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
executed 184 times by 1 test: *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
Executed by:
  • ssltest
184
612 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);-
613-
614 return 1;
executed 184 times by 1 test: return 1;
Executed by:
  • ssltest
184
615}-
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